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•	 Since	 June	 2014,	 Islamic	 State	 (IS)	 has	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	



















•	 Islamic	State	 is	 a	 real	 and	 serious	problem	 that	must	not	be	














































consequences	 of	 the	presence	of	 large	 immigrant	 communi-
ties	 from	 the	Middle	East	 in	 the	EU	 (although	 these	 are	not	
the	subject	of	this	analysis).	In	a	broader	sense,	this	is	a	prob-
lem	without	precedent	 in	 the	 last	 two	 centuries:	 a	 situation	
in	which	the	West	is	losing	its	strategic	initiative	in	the	Mid-
























































i. islamic statE – tErrorism fulfillEd 
(a tEntativE ovErviEw of thE problEm)













active	 Sunni	 communities	 fighting	 against	 the	 Americans	 and	
Shia	Muslims.	He	held	that	position	until	his	death	in	June	2006.	
Despite	 the	 serious	 crisis	 caused	 by	 al-Zarqawi’s	 death	 and	 the	




































Islamic	 State’s	methods	 include	 individual	 terrorism,	 notorious	
bomb	attacks	 (using	 suicide	bombers	 and	 car	bombs),	 dramatic	
executions	(of	journalists,	aid	workers	and	others),	mass	killings,	
etc.	 IS	has	 targeted	 the	security	 forces	and	 the	army,	as	well	as	
civilians,	which	in	the	case	of	Iraq	means	Shia	Muslims	and	Shia	
religious	sites.	Islamic	State	has	demonstrated	its	impressive	or-
ganisational	potential	by,	 for	 instance,	 simultaneously	carrying	
out	a	series	of	bomb	attacks	in	distant	locations	in	Iraq,	or	by	effec-
tively	breaking	into	prisons	in	Iraq	in	order	to	release	actual	and	
potential	members	 (including	 the	 infamous	 Abu	Ghraib	 prison	
near	Baghdad	in	2013).	The	financing	arrangements	of	the	Islam-










































focusing	 instead	on	 the	 ‘near	 enemy’,	 i.e.	 the	Shia	Muslims,	 re-
garded	as	particularly	dangerous	heretics;	as	well	as,	inevitably,	
US	troops.	Unlike	al-Qaeda,	Islamic	State	did	aspire	to	take	over	
































the	executions	of	 foreigners	 (journalists,	prisoners	 and	others),	
and	were	isolated	acts	carried	out	on-site,	whose	impact	rested	on	
the	brutality	and	the	professional	mediatisation	of	 the	acts	 (e.g.	
execution	 footage	 posted	 online).5	 Al-Qaeda’s	 specific	 character	
and	strength	rested	and	continues	to	rest	on	the	notorious	attacks	
carried	 out	 in	 the	West,	 targeting	 symbolic	 locations	 and	 civil-
ians,	which	required	much	more	sophisticated	logistics	(starting	
from	the	attacks	of	11	September	2001,	to	the	attack	on	the	com-



















































bogged	 down	 in	 trench	warfare	 and	 local	 clashes	 in	 Syria,	 but	
which	has	proved	capable,	having	been	tasked	with	a	well-defined	







the	 offensive,	 having	 seized	 the	 Iraqi	 army’s	weapons	 or	 taken	
over	abandoned	arms	caches.	Despite	Baghdad’s	efforts,	and	the	
support	it	received	from	powers	ranging	from	the	United	States	
to	 Iran,	air	strikes	by	coalition	 forces,	etc.,	 Islamic	State	has	ef-
fectively	held	its	ground.






































tively	 stopped	 and	 the	 organisation	 has	 sustained	 losses	 in	 the	
coalition	air	strikes,	it	has	retained	its	military	potential.


































the	 IS	 hard	 core	 is	 surrounded	 by	 secular	 forces	 (former	 Ba’ath	
party	members),	numerous	Iraqi	tribes,	Sufi	groupings	(which	for	
religious	 reasons	are	 considered	 to	be	hostile),	 and	finally,	 large	



















8	 Gold,	 silver	 and	 copper	 dinars	 modelled	 on	 the	 coins	 of	 the	 8th-century	
Umayyad	 Caliphate.	 However,	 the	 new	 currency	 seems	 to	 have	 mainly	


















legitimacy	 of	 the	 regimes	 in	 power,	 undermined	 the	 façade	 of	
republican	governance	modelled	on	Western	systems	 (by	 intro-
ducing	 the	 caliphate,	 i.e.	 a	 theocratic	 monarchy),	 and	 rejected	
the	concept	of	a	nation	as	the	basis	of	statehood,	replacing	it	with	
confessional	categories.	It	has	also	questioned	the	United	Nations’	
global	 system	governing	 the	 formation	of	new	states,	as	well	as	
the	regional	security	system	(which	had	been	dominated	by	the	
United	States	but	used	to	 take	the	 interests	of	 local	powers	 into	
account).	It	has	posed	a	direct	challenge	to	all	the	Arab	states	in	
the	region,	and	has	pledged	to	take	action	against	them.	It	is	sig-
nificant	 that	 Islamic	 State	 does	 not	 operate	within	 one	 state	 or	
part	 of	 it,	 but	 controls	 and	 unifies	 the	 territories	 of	 two	 states	
which	had	been	in	conflict	for	decades,	i.e.	Syria	and	Iraq.	It	has	
actively	 rejected	 existing	 international	 and	 political	 divisions,	
and	has	claimed	the	right	to	create	an	entirely	new	order.	In	the	







This	 refers	not	 just	 to	 Islam	and	 Islamic	 law	as	 its	 foundations;	




























troversies	 concerning	 its	 legality,	 has	 also	 become	 attractive	 to	
smaller	terror	organisations	scattered	around	the	world,	from	the	
Philippines	to	Pakistan,	from	the	Caucasus	to	Syria,	 Iraq,	Sinai,	
Libya,	 the	Maghreb	 and	Nigeria.	This	has	 elevated	 IS’s	prestige	
and	lent	more	credibility	to	the	ambitions	of	its	leaders	in	Raqqa.




is	 evidently	 totalitarian,	 systemically	 criminal	by	 international	
standards	 (with	 terrorism,	 brutal	 violations	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 in-
























ii. thE middlE East in thE shadow 
of islamic statE









And	finally,	 the	 focus	on	 Islamic	State	 seems	 to	have	overshad-
owed	much	broader	and	more	serious	problems	which	are	inde-
pendent	from,	or	parallel	to	the	IS.






1. Islamic State – an exception, or a typical problem?
1.1. The	Middle	East	at	war
Islamic	State	started	its	war	in	Syria	and	Iraq,	hoping	that	it	could	









































As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 brutal	 conflict	 involving	 ethnic	 and	 religious	














































cent	 years,	 Islamic	 terrorism	 has	 been	 the	 greatest	 challenge.	
In	 the	case	of	Sunni	 Islam,	 this	 refers	 to	 the	organisations	 that	
subscribe	 to	 the	ninety-year-old	 tradition	of	 the	Muslim	Broth-



































	– the	 role	of	 the	West	as	a	 civilisational	point	of	 reference	 for	
the	elites	and	societies	of	the	region,	without	any	permissible	
alternatives.

































situation	 of	 Israel	 has	 remained	 in	 suspension	 for	 decades,	with	
the	Israeli	state	controlling	the	Golan	Heights,	to	various	degrees	
the	West	Bank	and	the	Gaza	Strip,	and	with	the	process	to	formally	












temporary	 independent	 states,	 including	 consolidated	 political	
decision-making	centres,	institutions	replacing	state	bodies	(e.g.	
local	 administrations),	 integrated	 communities,	 armed	 forces,	
and	 independently	 conducted	 foreign	 and	 internal	 policies.	 In	
most	cases,	their	overtly	declared	objective	is	to	gain	formal	in-
dependence,	 the	absence	of	which	 is	often	 the	only	 reason	why	
such	entities	are	not	recognised	as	sovereign.	Islamic	State	is	also	
a	 para-state	 entity	 of	 this	 kind.	 The	 Kurdish	 Regional	 Govern-
ment	 in	 Iraq	 is	another	such,	 to	at	 least	 the	same	degree:	 it	has	





















the	conditions	of	 the	war).	Other	para-state	entities	 include	 the	




for	 instance	 in	 Iraq	 (the	 Basra	 autonomy),	 or	 indirectly,	 e.g.	 in	
Saudi	Arabia	(the	eastern	al-Ahsa	province),	and	most	important-
ly	 in	Turkey	 itself	 (the	Turkish	Kurds’	 long	 armed	and	political	
struggle	 for	 autonomy/independence,	 and	 the	 structures	 of	 the	
underground	Kurdish	state).
Another	problem,	which	cannot	be	neatly	separated	from	the	col-









hole	 (and	also	 a	perfect	breeding	ground	 for	what	 later	became	
Islamic	State).	Today	large	areas	in	Iraq	and	Syria	certainly	meet	








the	 constitutional	 order	 or	 openly	 challenge	 that	 order.	 Those	

















the	 territories	 in	 which	 they	 operate.	 There	 are	 also	 organisa-
tions	(often	also	terrorist	in	nature)	that	stem	from	confessional	











non-state	 forces	de facto	 conduct	 their	own	international	activi-




3. The Middle East – collapse of the system?
The	Middle	East’s	problems	associated	with	Islamic	State	may	be	
seen	either	as	a	stability	deficit	issue,	generating	local	disturbanc-

























formal	 independence	only	 in	 the	 1930s	 (e.g.	 Iraq,	Saudi	Arabia),	
1940s	 (e.g.	Syria,	 Jordan	or	 Israel),	or	even	 the	 1970s	 (some	Gulf	
states).	Given	their	huge	internal	dynamics,	this	means	that	they	
still	have	not	become	fully	consolidated.









mental	 nature	 of	 the	 crisis.	 One	 of	 them	 concerns	 the	 eroding	
legitimacy	of	 governments,	which	 are	 corrupt,	 built	 on	narrow	

































litically	 developed	 Arab	 states,	 shows	 that	 states	 as	 such	 have	
decomposed,	 and	 the	 prospects	 of	 restoring	 their	 functionality	
based	on	the	original	institutions,	and	reintegrating	them	within	
their	original	borders,	are	extremely	vague.











































in	 Islam	today	 is	probably	 the	strongest	movement	of	both	reli-
gious	and	spiritual,	as	well	as	moral	and	social	revival,	in	which	
social	 justice	 is	 an	 important	 element.	 Finally,	 Islam	 is	 a	 very	
spacious	 category,	 and	 is	 remarkably	open	 to	 interpretations:	 it	
can	be	at	 the	same	time	 the	 foundation	of	radical	anti-systemic	
movements	such	as	Islamic	State,	the	pillar	of	conservative	rule	in	
Saudi	Arabia,	Iran’s	theocratic	system	as	introduced	36	years	ago,	







are	not	 the	only	reason	why	 the	categories	which	used	 to	order	















17	 On	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 area	 under	 consideration	 here,	 the	 Arab	 Gulf	
states	are	experiencing	another	problem	that	stimulates	identity,	social	






















































































































ment	 area	 in	 Iraq,	 and	 has	 carried	 out	 operations	 against	 the	
Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	in	Iraq).




working	 to	undermine	 the	 regional	 order	 founded	 on	US	 influ-
ence	since	Khomeini’s	revolution,	and	has	pursued	an	expansive	


























Brotherhood	 (both	 in	Syria	 and	 in	Egypt),	 among	other	 factors;	
and	this	frigidity	is	visible	in	the	way	that	Ankara	has	been	dis-
tancing	itself	from	any	active	efforts	to	combat	Islamic	State.	Ten-






	– the	 actors	 involved	 are	 suspicious	 of	 their	 obvious	 enemies,	
but	also	of	their	supposed	allies;	and	finally
















nian	security	 forces	 (and	was	an	act	of	 sabotage	aimed	at	 supposed	plans	












































































Apart	 from	 their	 pragmatic	will	 to	 influence	 the	 unstable	 sur-
rounding	area,	and	fill	the	vacuum	left	by	the	United	States	as	its	
position	 in	 the	Middle	East	erodes,	another	crucially	 important	
motivation	in	this	respect	comes	from	the	reassessments	taking	






























of	 the	strength	of	 the	Turkish	state	and	economy,	and	on	 its	at-
tractiveness	to	the	neighbourhood.
In	both	 cases,	 identity	 transformations	have	also	played	an	 im-
portant	 role:	 both	 countries	 are	 increasingly	 emphasising	 and	
mythologising	their	former	imperial	and	civilisational	glory	and	
the	 continuity	 of	 their	 statehood,	 which	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	
their	neighbours	in	the	Middle	East.	Both	Turkey	and	Iran	have	












had	previously	been	 in	parliament	won	any	 seats)	 and	 the	pro-
cess	of	social,	political	and	economic	modernisation	with	a	strong	



















































identity	 problems	 and	 social	 tensions	 related	 inter alia	 to	 ques-
tions	about	democracy,	Islam,	nation	and	state	still	persist	in	both	
countries.	Both	are	also	affected	by	ethnic	and	religious	tensions,	
problems	with	 the	control	of	 territory	and	borders,	etc.	 In	both	
cases	(but	especially	in	Iran),	the	strength	and	credibility	of	the	
ruling	elite	rests	on	the	success	of	its	regional	policy.	At	this	stage,	

















iii. islamic statE and thE middlE EastErn 




















































al-Qaeda	 was	 the	 main	 target	 and	 Afghanistan,	 ruled	 by	 the	
Taliban	with	close	links	to	al-Qaeda,	was	the	main	theatre.	The	
USA	 administration	 quite	 quickly	 and	 effectively	 minimised	
the	risk	of	terror	attacks	on	US	territory	(no	major	attacks	have	
taken	place	there	since	2001),	effectively	disintegrated	both	al-




Afghanistan	within	 several	months.	 In	 Iraq,	 the	 situation	was	
fairly	similar	(even	if	the	scale	of	difficulty	was	greater):	when	
the	US	attacked	Saddam	Hussain’s	regime	in	2003,	it	crushed	it	
within	 a	month,	 and	by	 2007	 both	 Shia	 and	Sunni	 armed	 and	







included	 the	 political	 will	 to	 carry	 the	 campaign	 through,	 the	





















onstrated	 that	 it	was	 indeed	possible	 to	 defeat	 and	marginalise	










The	 coalition	 which	 has	 been	 fighting	 Islamic	 State	 under	 US	








and	 Iraq	 (including	 Jordan,	Saudi	Arabia,	Bahrain,	United	Arab	
Emirates	and	Qatar).	The	coalition	members	have	an	overwhelm-
ing	military	and	financial	advantage	over	 Islamic	State.	Moreo-

































finally,	 the	key	problem	concerns	 the	 fear	of	what	would	hap-
pen	 ‘the	day	after	victory’	and	how	it	would	affect	the	dynam-
ics	 of	 the	 regional	 proxy	war.	This	 takes	us	 to	 the	 second	 and	
decisive	problem	that	the	coalition	is	facing,	namely	the	absence	

































using	 a	massive	US	and	allied	military	presence,	 and	 in	Libya	





















In	 other	words,	 it	 seems	 that	 defeating	 Islamic	 State	militarily	
would	be	 a	 technically	 simple	 task	 if	 regular	 forces	 of	 external	
powers	 (especially	 the	United	States)	were	 involved,	and	a	rela-
tively	straightforward	one	if	 the	 local	 forces	combatting	IS	con-
solidated	 their	 efforts	 and	 received	 air	 support	 (in	 a	 variant	 of	







































political,	 economic,	 military	 and	 cultural	 power	 has	 been	 suffi-
cient	to	tie	the	Middle	East	to	the	West,	keeping	the	region	in	the	

























































































operation	was	 an	 example.	 Turkey	 has	 been	 the	most	 complete	
example	of	this	approach,	as	a	NATO	member	bordering	Europe,	

































The	Arab	 Spring,	which	 started	 in	December	 2010	 and	 affected	
all	 the	Arab	 states	 to	varying	degrees,	became	 (in	an	apparent-
ly	unplanned	way)	 inscribed	 into	 the	hopes	 for	an	evolutionary	
transformation	 of	 the	 Middle	 East.	 The	 Arab	 Spring	 was	 seen	
as	 a	 grassroots,	 pro-democratic,	 and	 consequently	 pro-Western	
movement	for	change,	of	which	Turkey	felt	it	was	the	patron.	Ex-
















































self	 (with	 the	 sole	 exception	of	Tunisia)	 the	 elites	 and	public	 are	
not	interested	in	Western	solutions.	Neither	does	a	strong	political	
(i.e.	primarily	 state)	 infrastructure	exist	which	could	absorb	 the	







3. The strategy of containment
The	end	of	2011	was	a	symbolic	moment	marked	by	a	final	break-
through	in	the	West’s	approach	to	the	Middle	East;	at	that	point	
the	 ultimate	withdrawal	 of	US	 forces	 from	 Iraq	 coincided	with	
a	sense	of	disappointment	with	 the	outcome	of	 the	Arab	Spring	
and	the	outbreak	of	the	civil	war	in	Syria.
Since	 then,	 the	West	 has	 realised	 that	 it	 had	 lost	 whatever	 in-
itiative	 in	 the	 region	 it	may	 still	have	had.	 It	has	 since	been	on	
the	 defensive,	 supporting	 the	 existing	 states	 (with	 the	 excep-






































































before	 2011	 and	 those	which	 fanned	 the	 Shia-Sunni	 conflict,	 as	
a	result	of	which	Islamic	State	came	into	being),	and	of	providing	








effects	 (paradoxically,	 Iran’s	 position	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 is	 the	







































































As	 far	 as	 the	 fight	 against	 Islamic	 State	 is	 directly	 concerned,	
Iran’s	 usefulness	 for	 the	 West	 and	 the	 coalition	 is	 disputable.	
Undoubtedly,	 Iran	 should	be	 credited	 for	 stopping	 IS’s	offensive	
in	Iraq,	and	for	some	successes	in	pushing	the	terrorists	back	in	
Syria	and	 Iraq.	 In	practice,	however,	 this	has	meant	expanding	
Iran’s	protectorate	over	Iraq.	One	could	also	be	concerned	at	the	
efficacy	of	 Iran’s	actions	 (whether	direct	or	carried	out	 through	
Shia	militias)	in	traditionally	Sunni	areas	that	are	hostile	to	Iran	










In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 traditional	 assumptions	 about	 the	Middle	
East,	the	emergence	of	the	Kurdish	para-state	in	Iraq	–	with	genu-
ine	political	legitimacy	(both	internal	and	external),	an	efficient	



































On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Kurdish	 para-states,	 and	 especially	 the	
Kurdish	regional	government	in	Iraq,	seem	to	be	a	fulfilment	of	
the	dreams	of	Western	elites,	ranging	from	the	liberals	to	the	US	















strongly	 oriented	 towards	 integration	with	 the	 EU.	 Finally,	 the	
Kurds	 at	 large	have	been,	 and	will	probably	firmly	 remain,	 op-
posed	to	the	radical	(and	terrorist)	forces	in	the	region,	including	
Islamic	State.	Their	involvement	in	radical	movements	has	been	
negligible;	 they	have	demonstrated	a	 remarkable	ability	 to	pre-














































sessments	 (Turkey’s	 rising	 ambitions,	 or	 the	mounting	 existen-
tial	 threats	 against	 Israel	 and	 its	 growing	 isolation),	 inter-state	
tensions	 (the	proxy	war;	 differences	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 outside	










































































































































8. A.H.	Cordesman,	 ‘The	New	 ‘Great	Game’	 in	 the	Middle	East:	
Looking	Beyond	the	IS	and	Iraq’,	CSIS,	July	9,	2014
http://csis.org/files/publication/140809_NewGreatGame.pdf
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Areas affected by military operations and conflicts
Countries in which a coup or violent socio-political conflict has taken place










































Extensive and long-term loss of control by the central government over an area
Short-term problems with control of an area
Tehran
Riyadh
Baghdad
Damascus
Nicosia
Beirut
Amman
Cairo
Manama
Doha
Asmara Sana'a
Khartoum
Kuwait
Abu
Dhabi
Tel Aviv
Mediterranean
Sea
Caspian
Sea
Gulf of Aden
Arabian
Sea
Red Sea
PersianGulf
6.	Middle	East	–	the	problem	of	state	control	over	its	territory
source:	Author’s	estimates
